One of the most curious and interesting cases of the Cold War related to commercial aviation was the strange case of the Soviet Union's interest in purchasing Western-made aircraft. Now, it may seem strange that the USSR would seek a solution to its domestic problems from its great political and military rivals, especially the United States, but this was the truth at times in the 70s and 80s.
Well, this story has its starting point in the late 60s. The Soviet Union was going through one of its rare periods of reasonable economic and financial stability, with the first years of Leonid Brezhnev's government proving essential in this recovery.
Such restructuring of the top brass and government policies also had an impact on Soviet society as a whole, which reached a record population of over 241 million inhabitants in 1970, who, more than ever, needed efficient means of transport to move around the vast dimensions of the USSR.
While railways and roads, despite their poor condition, were able to meet this demand, Soviet aviation was a different story. Neglected for years, the Soviet government was taken by surprise when a great demand for long-distance air transport began to emerge in the second half of the 60s, a trend that had been virtually non-existent in the country until then.
To meet this demand, the Soviet government soon realized that it would have to turn to the Soviet aviation industry, which responded with the launch of the Ilyushin Il-62 in 1967, the USSR's first medium- and long-range commercial jet aircraft. Although this aircraft addressed the initial shortcomings of Soviet commercial aviation, it soon became clear that this was merely a stopgap in a much more alarming scenario.
Soviet authorities realized that something more was needed, a high-density aircraft that could handle the exponential increase in enger numbers within the Warsaw Pact countries over the coming decades.
To this end, in October 1967, the Soviet Ministry of Civil Aviation (Aeroflot) released the specifications for the “aerobus” project. The aircraft would have to have 350 seats and a range of 3.600 kilometers (1.900 nautical miles) with a payload of 40 tons or 5.800 km (3.100 nautical miles) with occupied seats but no cargo. In addition, the aircraft would have to operate from airports with runways of up to 2.600 meters.
After a short-lived competition with Tupolev, Ilyushin gained the lead in developing the new aircraft, which would later be designated the Il-86. Despite rapid initial progress, due to the reuse of several Il-62 elements in the new design, Ilyushin found itself at a crossroads by mid-1971.
After redeg the entire aircraft at the request of the Soviet government, with the project going from a “super Il-62” to a large widebody, the first of its kind manufactured in the USSR, Ilyushin realized that there was no engine capable of propelling the new aircraft across Soviet territory. And to find a solution to the problem, Ilyushin and Aeroflot had to turn to their great enemy: the United States.
By the early 70s, American industry had already taken the lead in the development of commercial aircraft, with Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas and Lockheed leading the way and having their products exported to several nations.
The Soviets, in a diplomatic and public relations maneuver (linked to their own interests) then began to probe the possibility of one of the American companies being interested in selling aircraft or even designs for civilian purposes to Aeroflot. And, as incredible as it may seem, almost all American companies were interested in the Soviet proposal.
However, Lockheed was the quickest to capitalize on the invitation, agreeing to take a brand-new L-1011 TriStar for a demonstration flight in the Soviet Union in March 1974. This agreement was not interfered with by the American or Soviet governments, who saw no major problems in such an undertaking.
The Soviets were impressed with the TriStar as soon as it landed in Moscow, and soon showed genuine interest in the aircraft, including placing an order for 30 L-1011s to equip the Aeroflot fleet. In addition, the Soviets were extremely interested in negotiating a patent for the aircraft, seeking a faster and cheaper solution to the slow development of the Il-82.
Another interesting detail that helps to understand the Soviets' decision is that, even if the Il-82 project had continued to move forward at that time, the production line would have been restricted to 10-12 aircraft per year. With the purchase of the 30 TriStars, this problem would have been quickly remedied.
The news brought joy to Lockheed's own representatives, who had signed a lucrative agreement, which would be a welcome boost to the company's finances after the large expenditures on the development of the TriStar.
However, it did not take long for the proposal to fall through. Firstly, the British refused vehemently to supply the Rolls-Royce RB.211 engines that would power Aeroflot's TriStars. This decision was most likely a throwback to what had happened the last time the British had supplied a jet engine (the Rolls-Royce RB.41 "Nene") to the Soviets.
However, Rolls' official excuse is that the Soviet Union did not have industries that could repair and maintain engines under the minimum safety conditions stipulated by the manufacturer.
The second blow to the deal came from the US Chamber of Commerce, which denied permission for Lockheed and General Electric to supply an alternative propulsion source, the GE CF-6-50, due to trade restrictions and political developments in the US.
Without the engines, which for the Soviets were the most important part of the deal, there was no longer any point in negotiating with Lockheed, which could now only supply the L-1011 body shells. Thus, the deal fell through at the end of 1977.
But this would not be the last story between American aircraft and the Soviet government during the Cold War.
By the end of 1989, Aeroflot had turned its attention once again to its former American rivals. In a completely different scenario from the 70s, the Il-86 had just left the drawing board, Soviet commercial aviation had expanded significantly, and the USSR was falling apart politically as perestroika and other far-reaching measures attempted to save the country from economic catastrophe.
In this scenario of tightening belts and reducing costs, Aeroflot itself also had to enter this strict regime of cost containment – this mainly meant operational rationalization, in addition to replacing uneconomical aircraft with more efficient models.
To illustrate the point, there was a saying that the Ilyushin Il-86 (which now formed the backbone of Aeroflot's long-range flights) was barely the size of a DC-10, with the fuel consumption of an Antonov An-124; in other words, Soviet commercial aircraft were a sure loss.
And in a free-market economy, like the one proposed by Perestroika, this would be fatal for Soviet commercial aviation.
Thus, the path found was to once again go to the West in search of a solution. In a new consultation with American manufacturers for a larger, more economically efficient aircraft, Boeing emerged as the main interested party in the Soviet project.
From what little is known about the transaction, due to the chaos that was taking place in the Soviet Union, Aeroflot had established an initial agreement to lease 10 747-400s for the company's international and high-density flights, replacing the inefficient Il-62 and Il-82.
Obviously, the agreement did not end up leaving the negotiation stage, due to the internal deterioration of the USSR at the end of 1989.
Thus, Aeroflot's last chance to operate Western aircraft during the Soviet period was wasted. It would only be in 1992, under the aegis of the newly created Russian Federation, that Aeroflot would operate its first aircraft originating from foreign countries: the Airbus A310-300.
It would take another two years before the alliance between Aeroflot and American aircraft manufacturers was finally completed, with the Russian carrier adding the first Boeing 767-300ERs to its fleet in 1994.
