Although officially recognized as lasting from 1932 to 1935, the Chaco War had an unknown prologue in 1928, and from its first use, aviation proved to be the weapon best suited to the nature of warfare in the region. Due to the impossibility of Paraguayans and Bolivians to cover the Chaco in its entirety with ground forces, it was decided by both nations to concentrate forces in strong points, more specifically, forts and forts.
As had been proven in the First World War, attacking fortified positions had become a perfect tactic for the waste of lives, with open-faced attacks easily falling to the power of machine guns and artillery. Thus, the aircraft had become the ideal weapon for such operations, as the only means capable of overcoming an enemy's ground-based defenses.
Another detail that emphasized the importance of the airplane in the Chaco was that it had become the only weapon capable of surprising the enemy: in the vastness of the region, composed basically of steppes and prairies, there was nowhere to hide, whether to prepare an attack or to conduct reconnaissance. It was impossible to maintain with the enemy without having one's own movements observed, which basically negated a crucial aspect of reconnaissance.
Thus, aircraft were elevated from an allegorical role of an armed force to an essential mechanism in the development of military operations. On December 15, 1928, the Bolivians carried out the first proven use of military aviation in the Chaco, when a Breguet XIX and a Fokker CVB were deployed for a retaliatory mission against Paraguayan forces in Bahía Negra. Although the Breguet returned to base before completing its mission (due to mechanical problems), the Fokker continued on its course, managing to drop its bombs on the marked targets, later returning safely to its starting base.
This first episode led to an air arms race between both nations, which only after this incursion realized the importance of air weapons for the success of any operation in the Chaco. This mission also demonstrated the unpreparedness of the Paraguayan and Bolivian Air Forces in the event of an air war, and both countries were quick to reinforce themselves with weapons in the interlude between this first clash in 1928 and the much more serious one that would occur from 1932 onwards.
YEAR 1932
The 1928 ceasefire was merely a postponement in a situation that was proving unsustainable in the diplomatic and political fields. Both Bolivia and Paraguay refused to reestablish ties, while the military machinery of both countries was working at full steam ahead of a conflict that was now becoming inevitable.
The first country to take more concrete measures to strengthen its air arm was Paraguay. The military authorities of the Guarani country, alarmed by the Bolivian raid of December 15, assigned Captain Vicente Almandos Almonacid the task of reorganizing the Paraguayan air arm, protecting the practically defenseless skies of the nation. The first result of this aerial arms race were six Potez 25A.2 armed reconnaissance aircraft, ordered directly from the French manufacturer at the end of 1928. The following year, the Potez were ed by Paraguay's first reasonably modern fighters: a batch of seven Wibault 73C.1s, equipped with two synchronized 7,65mm Madsen machine guns.
These incorporations allowed the “Aviación en Campaña”, as the Paraguayan Air Force would become known during the conflict, to align the following units at the beginning of 1932: the 'Primera Escuadrilla de Caza', equipped with Wibaults; the 'Primera Escuadrilla de Reconocimiento y Bombardeo', equipped with Potez; the 'Escuela de Aviación Militar', which had a peculiar mix of Consolidated, Hanriot and Morane aircraft; the 'Escuadrilla de Transporte', which had Junkers, De Havilland and Breda aircraft at its disposal; in addition to the 'Escuela Aeronaval', equipped with Italian-made seaplanes, such as the Savoia-Marchetti, CANT and Macchi.
The “Bolivian Air Corps”, on the other hand, could not allow its enemy to gain the upper hand in establishing an organic and concrete air force. Despite apparently having a good advantage over its enemy in the number of aircraft, even after the purchases made by Paraguay in 1928/29, the Bolivian military was aware that such an advantage existed only on paper.
Of the five Fokker CVBs and seven Breguet XIX A.2s purchased by the country during the 1929s, only two and three of each model, respectively, remained in the army's arsenals at the beginning of the conflict, in very poor flying conditions. Fortunately, Colonel Bernardino Bilbao, head of the 'Cuerpo Aéreo', had no illusions about this force, and by the end of XNUMX, the unit had replacements for these old aircraft.
At the outbreak of war in September 32, the “Cuerpo Aéreo Boliviano” was organized as follows: the 'Escuadrilla de Caza', with four Vickers Type 143; the 'Escuadrilla de Reconocimiento y Bombardeo', equipped with five Vickers Vespa Mk.III Type 149 and three Breguet XIX A.2; and the 'Escuadrilla de Entrenamiento', with a handful of Caudron C.97 and Vickers Type 155 “Vendace III” trainers.
With these forces, the contenders went into battle. The first air movements in the Chaco began to develop in June 1932, with the Bolivian Air Corps establishing its first forward air base in the region, at Muñoz, with a second base at Villa Montes.
Although the conflict had not yet turned into a full-scale war at that point, the first acts of hostility were already developing in the Chaco. Bolivian aircraft regularly crossed Paraguayan airspace, and on June 15, the first casualty of the air war in the region occurred: a Bolivian Vickers Vespa was shot down by a combination of anti-aircraft fire and small arms fire, crashing inside Paraguayan territory.
This act of war promoted the displacement of Paraguayan air units to the area, establishing “Aviación en Campaña”, at the beginning of August, two advanced air fields, which would serve as the unit's main bases during much of the conflict: the first was located near Puerto Casado, receiving the appropriate name of Isla Taguató (Island of the Eagles, in Portuguese); the second base was located on Isla Poí, east of Neuland.
By the time the war broke out, with the start of the Battle of Boquerón, both Paraguayan and Bolivian aviation had already flown dozens of offensive missions, but had never encountered their counterparts in the air. That would change on September 9, when pilots from both sides were finally able to measure their strength for the first time. Two Paraguayan Potez 25A.2s came face to face with two Bolivian Vickers Scouts and a Vespa in the vicinity of Boquerón. The skirmish was savage, with almost all the aircraft involved being damaged in the fighting – despite this, all the aircraft managed to return to their home bases.
Throughout late 1932, four other aerial combats between Bolivian and Paraguayan aircraft were recorded, the most important of which occurred on 4 December, when a Vickers Scout piloted by Captain Rafael Pabón shot down a Paraguayan Potez 25A.2 near Saavedra. This was the first aerial kill of the Chaco War; but it would not be the last.
YEAR 1933
1933 would be key to understanding the development of the air war over the Chaco, since it was in this year that both sides would spend considerable funds to reinforce their air forces, with the aim of definitively gaining control over the skies of the region.
On the Paraguayan side, eight Potez 25 TOE, delivered new by the French firm at the end of 1932, were finally integrated into “Aviación en Campaña” at the beginning of 1933, forming the 'Segunda Escuadrilla de Reconocimiento y Bombardeo', which, together with its older brothers from the 'Primera', would form the backbone of the Paraguayan air force during the rest of the war.
However, this would not be the most powerful addition to the Paraguayan arsenal in 1933, as the Potez was overshadowed by the state-of-the-art Fiat CR20bis fighters, which were added to complement and later replace the venerable Wibault as the first-line fighters of the Paraguayan air force. A total of five of these aircraft were purchased, forming the 'Undécima Escuadrilla de Caza', known informally as 'Los Indios'. Only the cream of Paraguayan pilots were chosen to the ranks of the new squadron.
Bolivia had also strengthened considerably in the period between 1932 and 1933, with its air arm growing exponentially. The Andean country's first major purchase during the war in matters related to aviation would be a batch of nine Curtiss-Wright Hawk IIs, models 35A (8) and 65 Sea Hawk (1), which were delivered at the end of 1932.
Despite this, these aircraft only entered service in the second quarter of 1933, due to the issue of pilot and ground crew training. The Hawk IIs were spectacular aircraft, being at that time some of the most modern aircraft to equip a Latin American air force. Their appearance in the skies of Chaco was certainly an unpleasant surprise for the Paraguayan pilots, who now found themselves at the mercy of the fast Bolivian fighter.
But another unpleasant surprise awaited the Paraguayans in 1933: the Curtiss-Wright CW-C14R Ospreys purchased by the “Cuerpo Aéreo Boliviano”. 20 aircraft of this type arrived in Bolivia at the beginning of 1933, becoming, by the way, the largest order of aircraft made during the war (and one of the largest in South America during the period).
The Ospreys may not have been the fastest, most maneuverable, or best-armed aircraft of the conflict, but they certainly made up for these shortcomings by being the most reliable, rugged, and versatile of both forces. The CW-C14Rs were used in a myriad of missions, ranging from bombing, close air , reconnaissance, and even fighter aircraft—at a time when multi-role aircraft were still a thing of the future.
As each of the new air units came into operation on one side or the other of the front line, there was a shift in the balance of air power over the Chaco. Both sides were eager to test their new machines, and as soon as the opportunity arose, new wings were ready to fly over the region.
In February 1933, the Bolivian Ospreys were already leaving for their first war missions, mainly in the section of the front that ran from Toledo to Nanawa. However, on the 25th of the same month, the Osprey unit lost its first member, when one of the CW-C14Rs was shot down by anti-aircraft fire near Fortín Toledo.
In contrast, the first Paraguayan Fiat CR20bis landed at the advanced airfield of Isla Poí at the end of May, and were officially operational by mid-June. It was at this time that air operations in the Chaco would once again intensify, in conjunction with preparations for the great Bolivian winter offensive on Nanawa.
The most interesting events of this period were the aerial combats of June 11 and 12. The first, a small skirmish between three Fiats and four Ospreys, ended in a draw, after the Bolivians, surprised by the agile Paraguayan fighters, quickly fled to friendly territory.
However, the battle the following day was a different story, involving no less than 12 aircraft over the Aviación en Campaña HQ on Isla Poí. Originally planned as a surprise raid on the Paraguayan air force's central air arm in the Chaco, it was in fact the Bolivians who were ambushed in the battle.
Warned about the approach of the Bolivian aircraft, three Paraguayan Fiats set a trap for the five Ospreys, four Hawk IIs and a Vickers Scout that were approaching to bomb the base, with the simple incursion degenerating into an intense aerial combat. One of the Fiats was seriously damaged in the battle, being forced to land in a forced landing that killed its pilot. In compensation, one of the Hawk IIs also emerged damaged from the skirmish – but it returned safely to its home base.
Caught by surprise on both occasions, the Bolivians would rarely venture so far behind enemy lines thereafter. This left Paraguayan aviation to gain supremacy in the skies over the region for the first time, with Potez and Fiats being the most common sights over the front during most of the second half of 1933.
1934/1935 PERIOD
The constant advance of Paraguayan forces through the Chaco in the summer of 1933/1934 caused the high command of the Bolivian forces to go into alert mode, activating all possible resources to stop the onslaught of the Guarani army through the region.
Obviously, Bolivian air units were part of this contingency plan, and even though both sides were heavily committed to ing their ground forces during this period, no aerial combat was recorded throughout the first months of 1934. However, June saw a resurgence of battles in the skies over the Chaco, with four aerial combats recorded throughout the month.
The highlight was the clash on June 26, when three Paraguayan Potez 3 TOEs resisted an attack by a Bolivian Osprey and a Hawk II, near El Carmen. The Paraguayan aircraft emerged from the combat unharmed, while the Bolivian Osprey was slightly damaged in the battle. The Hawk, on the other hand, also emerged from the conflict without damage.
July and August also saw their share of heavy aircraft combat in the skies over the Chaco, as Paraguayan forces besieged and captured Bolivian defensive positions one by one. On July 8, four Paraguayan Potez and a Bolivian mixed formation consisting of two Ospreys and two Hawk IIs clashed over Fortín Ballivian, a fortification perched on the Pilcomayo River.
In the fierce fighting that ensued, all of the Paraguayan Potez were damaged – but the worst offenders were once again the Bolivians, who lost one Osprey in the battle, and the other aircraft of the same type involved in the fight returned to base seriously damaged. One of the Hawk IIs was also damaged, while the other escaped major damage.
But the loss of this aircraft would not be the worst shock for the “Cuerpo Aéreo Boliviano” in this period, since on August 12, Rafael Pabón, one of the leaders and most respected aviators of the Bolivian unit, was shot down in aerial combat against a Potez 25, near Fortín Madrejon.
In September, air combat again decreased in intensity, with a handful of small skirmishes taking place on some parts of the front, as the Paraguayan army moved further north towards the Bolivian-Paraguayan border. The highlight of this month was the introduction of new aircraft into the Bolivian arsenal: nine Curtiss “Cyclone” Falcon aircraft, which were purchased to replace losses to date, and two Junkers K43h, which would form the first military cooperation unit within the Bolivian armed forces, known as “Punta de Alas”.
December, on the other hand, saw a new surge in air activity as the situation of the Bolivian armed forces deteriorated rapidly. The ground units were in tatters, having suffered successive defeats at the hands of the more capable and better-led Paraguayan forces. Such setbacks were taking their toll on the morale of the troops, and only the aviation, with its meager resources, still had a reasonably intact spirit after two years of fighting.
Although the month began well for the “Cuerpo Aéreo Boliviano”, with a downing of a Potez by two Hawk IIs on 11 December, the final weeks took a melancholy tone, after the loss of a precious Hawk II to anti-aircraft fire on 26 December.
The last major Bolivian attempt to regain control of the skies during the war took place in the first weeks of 1935, when a raid consisting of eleven aircraft (three Junkers K43h, three Hawk II, two Ospreys, two Falcons and one Vickers Scout) attempted to attack strategic targets within Paraguayan lines, with the secondary objective of disrupting the activities of Paraguayan air units. Obviously, this attempt failed, and the Paraguayans were able to boast of having almost absolute control of the skies for the rest of the conflict.
BALANCE SHEET OF OPERATIONS
The Paraguayan strategy developed at the beginning of the war, which was initially based on containing the Bolivian forces and then repelling them with accurate and devastating blows, was the key to the victory of the Guarani forces after four years of conflict in the Chaco region. Using modern tactics, adapted to the characteristics of a 21st century conflict, the Paraguayan army managed to repel the invader, officially claiming the Chaco as a Guarani zone of influence.
One of the factors that most contributed to the triumph of the Paraguayan forces was the role that their leaders saw in aviation, put into practice first by Vicente Almandos Almonacid and later by Lieutenant Commander José Bozzano, leaders of the Paraguayan air force during the war years.
For example, for the Bolivians the airplane was just an allegorical weapon in the development of a combat, where the true importance lay in the movements on the ground; on the other hand, for the Paraguayans, aviation was the key to the development of battles, and essential to decree the success or failure of an operation.
Furthermore, for the Guarani military brass, aviation represented a means by which valuable soldiers' lives could be spared, with intelligence gathered by reconnaissance aircraft proving essential in the course of several successful maneuvers carried out by the Paraguayan army during the war.
On the Bolivian side, despite the disastrous defeat, the aviation was perhaps the only branch of the Andean country's armed forces that emerged with a strengthened image after the conflict, having fought valiantly against an adversary aware of its capabilities. Despite this, one cannot deny the serious flaws in the high command of the Bolivian aviation, which despite having almost twice as many aircraft as its adversaries during much of the conflict, was never able to establish clear air superiority over any part of the country. front.
Finally, it remains to take stock of the losses on both sides, with regard to the air forces. For the Paraguayans, the losses would be (adding those resulting from accidents and combat): seven Potez (models A.2 and TOE), three Fiat CR20bis, two Wibault 73C.1, one DH60 Gipsy Moth, one Fleet-2 and one Macchi M-18A.R.
Bolivian losses during the period 1932-35 were even worse than those suffered by their adversaries: twelve Osprey CW-C14R, four Curtiss “Cyclone” Falcon, four Curtiss Hawk II, three Vickers (Scout) Type 143, two Vickers Type 149 “Vespa III”, one Junkers K 43h, one Junkers W 34ci, one Ford Trimotor and one Vickers Type 155 “Vendace III”.
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